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Abstract 
In this paper we evaluate the poverty and distributional effects of fiscal spending and trade policies 
within a simultaneous framework. We provide the first systematic analysis testing for the existence of 
complementarities between trade and fiscal spending policies using data from Latin America. We 
show that the benefits of trade openness especially for the low income and middle class household 
groups greatly depend on the size of the government-provided social and human capital. Conversely, 
the benefits of publicly-provided of social-human capital for the poor depend to a large extent on the 
degree of openness of the trade regime. Social-human capital has a much smaller effect on household 
incomes when trade is restricted and may even have a deleterious effect if trade is sufficiently 
restricted. Efforts to promote trade have lower positive effects for households if the per capita social 
and human capital is low.   
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I. Introduction 
Trade liberalization often implies important changes in the composition of production as well as in 
output and factor prices with significant impact on both the level of aggregate income and its 
distribution. These changes may induce negative consequences for the poor and for income 
distribution (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2004 and 2007). A policy issue is how to mitigate the potentially 
negative effects on the poor and on equity that increasing trade openness may entail.  
Studies have focused on the role of social policies and emergency anti-poverty programs to 
limit the social costs associated with major restructuring of economic activity. In fact, some countries 
in Latin America have implemented large social transfer programs to mitigate the negative 
consequences of such economic restructuring.1 However, the welfare of the poor and other low 
income classes depends more on stocks of social or human capital rather than on flows of social 
spending.2 While social spending contributes to build social capital it often takes time to achieve its 
impact; one of the main effects of these programs is their contribution to gradually building up stocks 
of social or human capital while the instantaneous direct effects on household welfare are likely to be 
of second order of importance and also mainly short-lived.  
If the financing of the new social programs is through a reallocation of public spending an 
important question is what other spending items are cut. Recent studies have shown that certain 
countries in Latin America devote more than 50% of their revenues to providing subsidies to small 
economic elites to the detriment of spending in social and other public goods that generally are pro-
growth and tend to benefit the majority of the population, not merely the wealthy (López and 
Galinato, 2007). So, one may speculate that cutting non-social subsidies to finance the build-up of 
social capital may be an effective way of promoting equity and reducing poverty. 
In addition, there is the issue of the effectiveness of social spending to raise household 
income, especially of the poor. An important question is whether or not social spending is in fact 
targeted to the development of social capital stocks that benefit the poorest segments of society and 
whether social capital stocks are effective in reducing poverty and income disparities. There is a 
suspicion that many social programs in Latin America, including expenditures in public education, 
                                                        
1
 Throughout this paper we use an extended definition of social spending to include not only direct social transfers but also social 
security, spending in education, health care, social housing, and related items. 
2
 Even direct social transfer programs can be regarded as building units in constructing the necessary social infrastructure to 
“reach” the poor and allowing the poor to get better nourishment and education both of which involve stock effects that take years 
of consistent flow spending policies to build. Spending on other social goods such as education and health are obviously 
contributions to build human capital stocks. 
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health care and others, are in fact poorly targeted and create social capital that end up benefiting more 
the middle and even upper classes rather than the poor (Goñi et al. 2008). 
The conventional approach in the literature has been to examine the poverty and distribution 
effects of trade policies and fiscal policies separately. A common feature of the vast trade policy evaluation 
literature summarized by Goldberg and Pavcnik’s (2004) comprehensive survey article is that the 
connections between trade liberalization and inequality and poverty are established making abstraction of 
the fiscal spending environment which may nonetheless affect the size and even direction of the impact of 
trade policy. This piecemeal approach continues to prevail in more recent analyses of trade policy as shown 
by the more recent survey by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) and by Perry and Olarreaga (2006). 
Similarly, the literature examining the effects of fiscal policy on poverty and inequality has 
largely made abstraction of the role of the trade regime in affecting the consequences of trade policy 
(van de Walle, 1998; Chu et.al., 2000; Wodon et.al., 2003; Goñi et.al., 2008;  López and Torero, 2010; 
López and Islam, 2008). This piecemeal evaluation approach is likely to contribute to explain the 
often contradictory findings encountered in these literatures. If for example there are important 
complementarities between fiscal spending in social goods and trade policy, the partial evaluation of 
each of these policies may yield highly unstable results; when the author uses data for countries that 
spend a lot in social goods the effect of trade liberalization may be large, pro-poor and pro-equity, but 
authors analyzing countries where social spending is low would reach opposite conclusions.3 
In this paper we break with this traditional piecemeal approach. We evaluate the poverty and 
distributional effects of fiscal spending and trade policies within a simultaneous framework. We provide 
the first systematic analysis testing for the existence of complementarities between trade and fiscal 
spending policies using data from Latin America.  Fiscal expenditures often lead to the creation of capital 
stocks that over time impinge on the income of the various household groups.4  We focus on the 
complementarities and substitutions that may arise between these government-provided capital stocks and 
trade policies for household incomes. We distinguish between government-provided social or human 
capital stocks created over time mostly through government expenditures in social goods and government-
provided non-social capital stocks created over time by government spending in non-social goods.  
A hypothesis that we test is that government-provided social or human capital stocks tend to 
make the benefits of trade liberalization larger and better distributed across the households and that a 
more open trade regime increases the pay-off of social capital especially for the poorest households. In 
addition, we test the hypothesis that the effect of social capital is enhanced by a more open trade regime.   
To test the above hypotheses we use existing data for Latin American and Caribbean countries 
on public spending over the period 1987-2006. We use government spending in social programs series to 
construct stocks of government-provided social capital and series of spending in non-social goods to 
construct series of non-social capital stocks. In addition, we use measures of the degree of trade openness 
available in the literature that are computed annually for each country in the region. These data is 
combined with data from periodical household surveys implemented in many countries that allow 
computing various measures of poverty and income distribution. We examine how the size of the effect 
of trade openness on poverty and, more generally income distribution, is affected by the social and non-
social government-provided capital stocks. If the hypothesis that trade liberalization and government-
provided social capital is correct we would expect that the estimated elasticity of poverty with respect to 
trade openness be lower in countries that have greater per capita social capital stocks than those that have 
a lower stock. If trade openness (ceteris paribus) increases poverty the size of such effect would be lower 
in countries exhibiting a higher social capital stock and if the effect is to decrease poverty this effect 
would be magnified in countries lower stocks of social capital. 
                                                        
3
 Even the few studies of fiscal policies that “control” for the trade regime or studies of trade liberalization that control for certain 
aspects of fiscal policies do not really deal with the issue of interaction among policies; that is, merely controlling for the other 
policies does not by itself allow one to measure and test how the effectiveness of one set of policies affect that of the other one. 
4
 Government spending rarely has merely instantaneous effects; expenditures create capital in the form of social or human capital 
and non-social capital including infrastructure and others. 
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II. Econometric model 
A. The basic specification 
We divide the total household population of a country into M social groups to reflect the income 
distribution. We assume that the per capita household income of a particular group i  at time t  in 
country j , ijty , is determined by the per capita stock of government-provided social goods,
 
s
jtS , per 
capita stock of government-provided non-social goods,
 
n
jtS , which in turn are related to past allocations 
of government expenditures in social and non-social goods, respectively. In addition, we hypothesize 
that income distribution is associated with the country’s per capita GDP, jtY  by characteristics of the 
trade regime,
 
jtZ , by unobserved random or fixed effects specific to the social group in each 





Thus, if there are M household groups, we have a system of M equations such as,   
(1)        1 2 3 4s nijt ij i jt i jt i jt i jt jt ijty S Y Z S vψ α α α α ε= + + + + + +% %% ,             Mi ,.....2,1=  
Importantly, the time-varying effects jtv% , which are a generalization of the standard fixed 
effects, control for a myriad of possibly unobserved (or at least hard to measure with precision) and 
hence omitted time-varying country variables that may affect the income of the various groups 
including macro and microeconomic policies, external shocks, institutional changes and so forth.5 
That is, the specification postulated in Equation (1) controls for both group specific effects, ijψ% , 
allowing them to be different within and across countries as well as for non-random country-specific 
effects that change over time in a different way for each country ( jtν% ). Also we note that the 
                                                        
5
  Data on some important economy-wide variables (i.e., taxes, subsidies, various components of private capital stocks, and so forth) 
can often be estimated from existing statistics but with a low degree of precision. Thus, one could use these estimated variables 
but at a high cost associated with increased measurement errors biases caused by the use of explanatory variables that are gauged 
with little precision. We choose instead to use a more parsimonious model specification that relies on few conventional 
explanatory variables but that rely on country time-varying effects to control for the possible omitted variable biases associated 
with such a parsimonious model. 
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parameter vectors, i1α , i2α , 3iα , and 4iα  are all allowed being different for each of the M household 
income groups considered in order to allow for differential effects of the respective variables on the 
per capita income of each particular group. The flexibility to estimate such a large number of 
parameters is possible because we jointly estimate the M group income equations. 
The system estimation of the complete income distribution used here is more flexible and 
more general than most other specifications popular in the existing literature which use isolated 
measures of income distribution or poverty (such as Gini coefficients, proportion of the population 
below the poverty threshold, per capita income of the poorest quintile, and so forth). This flexibility is 
due to the large number of degrees of freedom which, in turn, permits us to use methods such as the 
country time-varying effects which demand a great deal of observations.   
The above model postulates that group per capita incomes are associated to the stocks of 
government-provided capital accumulated through government spending over many years, not directly 
to the current flows of government expenditures. While we have data on the flows of government 
expenditures for various key components we do not have direct measures of their respective stock 
levels.  We use a perpetual inventory model to construct capital stocks series for social and non-social 
goods using the government-provided expenditures in social and non-social goods, respectively 
(Griliches, 1979). The stock of publicly-provided social goods at time t  in country j ( sjtS ) is, 
(2)        1(1 )s sjt jt s jtS gs Sδ −= + − , 
where jtgs are real government expenditures in social goods at time t  and sδ  is the rate of 
depreciation of social public goods. In addition the perpetual inventory method derives the initial 
stock of capital ( 0sjS ) as follows, 






η δ= + , 
where jsη  is the rate of growth of the government expenditure in social goods.  Using (3) and (2) we 
can construct a series of government-provided social capital stock over the sample time. A similar 
approach is used to estimate the stock of non-social government-provided capital ( njtS ). A problem 
with this approach is that one needs to assume the rates of depreciation that apply to each capital 
stock. We use depreciation rates often used in the literature but we check the sensitivity of the results 
to varying the depreciation rates within reasonable ranges. 
We estimate equation system (1) log differences. Expressed in changes over time the system 
of M  equations become,  
(4)        1 2 3 4s Y nijt i jt i jt i jt i jt jt ijtg e g z e vα α α α ε= + + + + + ,                     Mi ,....,1=  




jt jt jtg Y Y −≡ −  ; 1
s s s
jt jt jte S S −≡ −  ; 1
n n n
jt jt jte S S −≡ −  ; 1jt jt jtz Z Z −≡ −  ; 
1jt jt jtv v v −≡ −% %  
It is important to note that while the fixed group effects ( ijψ% in (1)) vanish in (4) due to the 
specification in differences the time-varying country effects ( jtv ) do not disappear and in fact play a vital 
role in mitigating biases due to omission of country-wide unobserved variables.  Alternatively, we may 
assume that ijψ%  is random in which case Equation (4) can be enhanced to include a random effect factor. 
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The change of the government stock variables from period t–1 to t  is equal to the 
government spending at time t–1 in the respective stock, less the depreciation of the stock. Thus, an 
additional advantage of using differences is that effectively using lagged instead of current 
government expenditures implicit in the stocks of government-provided capitals mitigates possible 
biases in the estimation of the coefficients due to reverse causality between government spending 
patterns and household income groups.  Under certain assumptions we could also justify the use of 
lagged trade regime indicators instead of current ones. It is likely that changes in the trade regime may 
not have an instantaneous effect on the income distribution across groups.  Under this assumption we 
could use lagged values of both the government spending variables and trade openness indicators 
which may mitigate reverse causality biases. 
However, even if we use lagged values for the government spending and trade indicators we 
could still have biases and inconsistencies if the lagged values of these variables are correlated with 
unobserved or omitted variables that in turn affect current group household incomes.   But the fact that 
we control for country-specific time-varying effects ( jtv ) prevents these biases as long as the omitted 
variables in each country are economy-wide and not group-specific.  
In the benchmark estimation we disaggregate the households into four income groups: the 
poor, defined as the households in the bottom two quintiles of the income distribution, the middle 
class encompassing the households in the 41% to 70% of the income distribution, the upper middle 
class including households in the 71 to 90%, and the rich which include the households in richest 10% 
of the distribution. Alternatively, we divide the households into the ten income deciles. Apart from 
providing richer measures the use of all ten deciles instead of four groups contributes to shed light into 
the effects of the variables of interest into the poorest segments of society.  We estimate the four or ten 
equations as a SUR system. 
B. Generalizations of the basic model 
1. Trade openness and government-provided capital stocks: interactions 
Given our purposes we need to generalize (1) and (4) to allow for interactions between the government-
provided capital stocks and the trade openness indicators. These interactions measure how the effect of 
trade openness on the income distribution profile is affected by the government capital stocks and vice-
versa. Thus, Equation (1) is generalized to allow for such interactions as follows:  
(1’)        1 2 3 4 1 2s n s nijt ij i jt i jt i jt i jt i jt jt i jt jt jt ijty S Y Z S S Z S Z vψ α α α α β β ε= + + + + + + + +% %% ;          Mi ,.....2,1=  
where the group-specific coefficients 1iβ  and 2iβ  measure the interactions between the trade regime 
and the effectiveness of government-provided social and non-social stocks. This specification in 
differences becomes, 
(4’)        1 2 3 4 1 2s Y n s nijt i jt i jt i jt i jt i jt i jt jt ijtg e g z e I I vα α α α β β ε= + + + + + + +  
where 1 1( )( )s s stj t t t tI S S Z Z− −≡ − −  and 1 1( )( )n n ntj t t t tI S S Z Z− −≡ − −
 
2. Joint estimation of trade openness 
In addition we extend the system to M+1 equations by estimating a trade openness relationship jointly 
with the group income functions. We postulate that trade openness as measured by a “structure trade 
intensity” (SATI) index (to be defined below) is determined by per capita income, the stocks of 
government-provided social and non-social capital stocks, by trade policies  including import tariff 
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levels, tariff dispersion and the existence of free trade agreements and by the country-specific time-
varying effects.6  The fact that we estimate this equation jointly with the group income equations give 
us the degrees of freedom needed control for time-varying country effects in this equation as well. 
Thus, the trade openness equation estimated in difference form is the following: 
(5)         1 2 3 1 2 3s Y njt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jtz e g e m d trγ γ γ µ= + + + Ω + Ω + Ω + Λ +  
where jtm , jtd , and jttr  are the annual change in average tariff, in tariff dispersion and in the 
number of free trade agreements, respectively, jtΛ are the time-varying country effects, and jtµ is a 
random disturbance.  
It is expected that the average tariff level lowers trade openness. Free trade agreements may 
increase or reduced the volume of trade; as is well known, trade agreements have trade creation and 
trade destruction effects, so the net effect is in general ambiguous. Tariff dispersion is also likely to 
have an ambiguous effect on trade openness. Thus, the effects of free trade treaties and of tariff 
dispersion on trade openness are mainly an empirical matter. 
                                                        
6
  The SATI index normalizes the trade flows of a country by its size, geographic location, population and several other natural 
structural factors that are likely to affect trade openness. In this way SATI captures mainly the relative degree of openness of the 
countries that are associated with factors such as trade policy that are often endogenous to the country in question. 
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III. The data 
The average annual group per capita income is obtained from household surveys in the different 
countries considered; the data was converted to purchase power parity in constant 2005 US dollars. 
We combine the data obtained from the Chen and Ravallion income inequality data set available at the 
World Bank’s PovcalNet, and the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(CEDLAS and World Bank). Table 1 shows a description of the data used in the main regressions and 
their respective sources. In the appendix we provide a summary statistics of these data.  
The stocks of social capital have been created applying the “perpetual inventory method” 
using the data on government expenditures for social and non-social items using expressions (2) and 
(3). We have created the series of social and non-social government-provided capital stocks assuming 
a 3% annual rate of depreciation for social capital and 6% for the non-social capital stocks.  
The SATI was calculated following the methodology developed by Lant Pritchett (1996), in 
which the SATI is the residual of the following regression, using the 18 countries included in the 
sample of analysis: 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7
ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
ln( _ )
ijt i i jt i jt i jt i jt
i jt i i ijt
Trade population area areasq GDPpercapita
GDPpercapita sq OilExporter IndEconomy
α α α α α
α α α ε
= + + + +
+ + + +
 
The definitions and sources of each variable used in the SATI regression are described in 
Table A2 in the appendix. 
TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES OF THE VARIABLES USED IN THE REGRESSIONS 
Variable Description Source 
Per capita income 
of group 1 Average yearly per capita income in Group 1 (0 - 40%) Chen & Ravallion income inequality dataset available at the World Bank’s 
PovcalNet 
<http://iresearch.worldbank.org/Povcal
Net/jsp/index.jsp> & Socio-Economic 
Database for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (CEDLAS and World Bank) 
<http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar
/sedlac/esp/estadisticas.php> 
Per capita income 
of group 2 
Average yearly per capita income in Group 2 (41 - 
70%) 
Per capita income 
of group 3 Average yearly per capita income in Group 3 (71 -90%) 
Per capita income 
of group 4 
Average yearly per capita income in Group 1 (91-
100%) 
(continues) 
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Table 1 (conclusion) 
Social 
Expenditure  
Per Capita Government Expenditures in the following 





- Social Protection and transfers 
Non Social 
Expenditure 
Per Capita Government Expenditures in the following 
COFOG categories:  
ECLAC Statistics 
- Non-social transfers 
- Defense 
- Economic Affairs 
- Public Order &Safety 
- Transport & Communications 
Per capita GDP Self explanatory World Development Indicators 
Per capita stock 
social capital  
Per capita stock of government provided social capital, 
calculated using the inventory method, with 3% of 
depreciation and using the rate of growth of social 
expenditure to estimate the initial stock 
Own calculations 
Per capita stock 
of non-social 
capital  
Per capita stock of government provided non social 
capital, calculated using the inventory method, with 6% 
of depreciation and using the rate of growth of non-
social expenditure to estimate the initial stock 
Own calculations 
Tariff Weighted average tariff International Trade and Integration Division, ECLAC, taken from WITS 
Treaties Index that represents the number of treaties active in 
each year for each country 
International Trade and Integration 
Division, ECLAC, taken from WITS 
Tariff dispersion Standard deviation of the tariff divided by its weighted 
average 
International Trade and Integration 
Division, ECLAC, taken from WITS 
Polity2 Score ranges from -10 to 10, with the more democratic 
a nation, the higher the score. 
Polity IV    
www.cidcm.umd.edu 
Years of duration 
of the last political 
regime 
Number of years since the most recent regime change 




Score that indicates how competitive is the Political 
System 
Polity IV    
www.cidcm.umd.edu 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
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IV. The results 
A. Specification tests 
Table 2 shows the joint estimates of the four per capita group income equations and the trade openness 
equation allowing for interactions between the effects of trade openness and government-provided 
social and non-social capital. We now implement various specification tests. 
1. Trade/capital stocks interactions 
We tested for the joint significance of the trade/capital stocks interactive effects finding that these 
interactive terms are jointly significant. That is, we tested the hypothesis that 1 2 0i iβ β= =  for all 
1,..., 4i = . As can be seen in Table 2 the likelihood ratio test rejects the restricted model by a 
significant margin. What this test shows is that the level and composition of government-provided 
capital stocks are important determinants of the impact of trade on the per capita income of the 
household groups and that the effects of trade openness should not be evaluated ignoring the level and 
composition of publicly-provided capital. 
2. Country specific time-varying effects 
We also tested for the validity of the country time-varying effects against the restriction that all 
country effects are fixed. That is, we tested the null hypothesis that jt jν ν=  and jt jΛ = Λ  for all j . 
As can be seen in the table the restricted fixed country effect model is rejected by a wide margin in 
favor of the time-varying effect model. 
Thus, the above two specification tests corroborate the key tenets of this paper: that the effects 
of trade policy and of government spending policies on income distribution should not be evaluated 
independently to each other, and that merely controlling for fixed effects is an inadequate procedure. 
3. Biases due to endogenous capital stocks and trade policy index 
Despite that the capital stocks are derived by accumulating lagged government expenditures to the 
previous stocks it is possible that such lagged expenditures be correlated with omitted concurrent 
variables which could bias the estimates. We argued in the previous section that the fact that we used 
time-varying effects largely minimizes such risk. We nonetheless use instrumental variables for both 
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capital stocks and trade to see whether or not the key qualitative results are affected by the use of 
instrumental variables. 
We use several political and institutional variables as identifying instruments including 
measures of political competition, years of democratic stability and the so-called Polity2 index, in 
addition to the lagged trade policy indicators (average tariff, tariff dispersion and treaties, all lagged 
one period).7 The description of the politico-institutional variables can be found in Table 1. We 
postulate that the politico-institutional variables are correlated with the stocks of social and non-social 
capital because when institutions are more democratic and transparent politicians are likely to be more 
responsive to social concerns. One of the main social issues in Latin America is the concentration of 
income and poverty. So we can reasonably expect that more democratic societies will tend to spend a 
greater fraction of public spending in social goods as opposed to subsidies that are often captured by 
small elites. Thus, we expect a positive correlation between the quality of politico-institutional 
variables and social capital stocks and a negative one with non-social stocks. 
The politico-institutional identifying instrumental variables are also likely to satisfy the 
exclusion restriction in the context of our model. The exclusion restriction requires that the 
instruments be uncorrelated with the errors of the main regressions. That is, in our case should be 
uncorrelated with the disturbances of the group income equations (all the effects of the instruments 
should take place via the variables that are instrumented, in this case the stocks of social and non-
social capitals and trade index). The fact that we control for time varying country effects makes it 
plausible that the exclusion restriction is in fact satisfied. The time varying effects control for all 
omitted economy-wide factors that may affect the distribution of income. Hence, they should also 
control for any direct effects of the politico-institutional that are not channeled through the capital 
stocks or trade index. That is, the often elusive exclusion restriction is likely to be satisfied.    
Table AII.1 in Appendix II shows the results using Three Stage Least Square (3SLS) 
estimators instead of the usual single equation IV estimators in order to allow for the disturbances 
across equations to remain correlated. In this case we do not use interactive terms so the estimated 
coefficients directly show net effects (that is, this model uses the specification shown by equation (4)).  
Below we compare these results to the net effects estimated using our benchmark estimates (based on 
Equation (5)) and  show that in general the use of 3SLS did not affect the fundamental qualitative 
results concerning the net effects of social and non-social capital stocks and of trade openness on the 
group incomes. Thus it appears that the use of country time-varying effects in conjunction with lagged 
fiscal spending variables to construct the capital stocks is an effective mechanism by itself to prevent 
biases of the key coefficients.    
B. Analysis of the estimates 
We now turn to the analysis of the coefficient estimates. The net impact of the social and non-social 
capital stocks on income distribution is the result of two effects: a direct effect and an indirect one that 
occurs via the interaction with the trade openness variable. The direct effect of per capita government-
provided social capital stock is positive and highly significant for all four groups while the direct 
effect of the per capita non-social government stocks is negative and significant for the poor and lower 
middle classes, non-significant for the upper middle class but positive and significant for the richest 
                                                        
7
  Political Competition is a key instrumental variable used. It combines information regarding Regulation of Participation and 
Competitiveness of Participation. Regulation of Participation measures the extent that there are binding rules on when, whether, 
and how political preferences are expressed. One-party states and Western democracies both regulate participation but they do so 
in different ways, the former by channeling participation through a single party structure, with sharp limits on diversity of 
opinion; the latter by allowing relatively stable and enduring groups to compete nonviolently for political influence. The polar 
opposite is unregulated participation, in which there are no enduring national political organizations and no effective regime 
controls on political activity. In such situations political competition is fluid and often characterized by recurring coercion among 
shifting coalitions of partisan groups. Competitiveness of participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for 
policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena. 
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group. We first consider the net effects evaluated using average values of the variables (that is, as if 
we consider a “representative” country of the region) and then we look at the net effects going beyond 
the average by considering the variability of the key variables over time and across countries. 
 
TABLE 2 
JOINT ESTIMATES OF THE GROUP PER CAPITA INCOME AND TRADE OPENNESS:  
SUR-TIME-VARYING COUNTRY EFFECTS METHOD 
  Log Diff Per capita 
income of group 1 
Log Diff Per capita 
income of group 2 
Log Diff Per 
capita income 
of group 3 
Log Diff Per 
capita income 




Log Diff Per capita 
stock of social 
capital  
0.316 *** 0.387  *** 0.390  *** 0.714  *** 0.436 *** 
0.105  0.0844  0.0815  0.128  0.0657  
Log Diff Per capita 
stock of non-social 
capital  
-0.751 *** -0.340  *** -0.0312  0.482  *** -0.0380  
0.113  0.0909  0.088  0.139  0.0718  
Log Diff SATI   
0.0112  1.23  3.826  ** 3.247  
 
 
2.15  1.72  1.654  2.605  
 
 
Log Diff  (Per capita 
stock social 
capital*SATI)  
0.865 *** 0.561  *** 0.387  ** 0.321  
 
 
0.213  0.17  0.163  0.256  
 
 
Log Diff (Per capita 
stock non-social 
capital *SATI) 
-0.881 ** -0.664  ** -0.775  ** -0.613  
 
 
0.411  0.328  0.314  0.495  
 
 
Log Diff Per capita 
GDP   
1.142 *** 0.683  *** 0.603  *** 0.0228  -0.474 *** 
0.262  0.21  0.203  0.32  0.147  


















 0.0141  
















 0.0105  















 0.0309  
R-squared  0.885  0.888  0.894  0.872  0.897  
 
LR test: restricted model without 
interactions, unrestricted model 
including interactions: 106 
LR test: restricted model country 
fixed effects, unrestricted model 
time varying country effects: 1485.2 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Note: (i) The total number of observations for the equation system is 720. 
(ii) All explanatory variables with the exception of tariffs, trade agreements and tariff dispersion are per capita. 
(iii) Standard errors are shown below the coefficients: ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
(iv) Estimation includes 124 coefficients to capture the time-varying country effects, which are not shown in the table. 
(v) Critical values for the LR tests at 1% level of significance are 2χ  (2)=9.21 and for 2χ  (107)=143.94. 
 
 
1. Analysis for the average or representative case 
Table 3 shows the net effects of the two stock variables and trade index on the per capita income of 
the various household groups, measured in terms of elasticity, and calculated using the coefficients in 
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Table 2 with all net effects evaluated at mean values of the variables. The net effect of social capital 
on per capita income is positive and significant for all income groups but the net effect of non-social 
capital is positive and significant only for the richest group, is insignificant for the upper middle class 
and negative and significant for the poorest two groups. These results imply that the effect of non-
social government spending is not only bad for equity but that it may be absolutely deleterious for the 
poorest segments of society.  Social capital on the other hand has a positive and significant impact on 
the per capita income of all groups. It benefits most of the population more or less equally except for 
the top group that seems to derive even greater benefits than the rest of the household population. That 
is, while social spending appears to promote higher household income for all groups, it is not pro-
distribution.   
TABLE 3 
NET ELASTICITIES OF GROUP INCOMES WITH RESPECT TO SOCIAL CAPITAL,  
NON-SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND TRADE OPENNESS 
 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Net effect of Per Capita 
Stock of Social Capital 
0.31 *** 0.38 *** 0.39 *** 0.71 *** 
0.105  0.084  0.081  0.128  
Net effect of Per Capita 
Stock of Non Social 
Capital 
 -0.75 ***  -0.34 *** -0.03  0.48 *** 
0.11  0.09  0.09  0.14  
Net effect of SATI 
-0.08  0.32 ** 0.29 ** 0.58 *** 
0.17  0.14  0.13  0.21  
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Note: * significant at 10%.  
*** significant at 5%. 
*** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors are shown below the estimates. 
 
 
Thus, governments in Latin America appear on average to gear non-social capital mainly to 
benefit the rich but surprisingly non-social capital is deleterious to the poor and lower middle income 
classes. A possible explanation for this is that government provided non-social goods tends to make 
the economy more capital-intensive thus hurting the unskilled which are among the poorest groups in 
society. Expansion of non-social capital may crowd out more labor-intensive investments that would 
benefit the poorest segments of the labor force. 
Social capital provided by the government is genuinely complementary with private 
investments as shown by the fact that it increases income of all households significantly, but it is not 
pro-distribution. However, as shown in Table 3, the net effects the social capital evaluated at mean 
values of the variables has an almost identical net proportional effect on three of the four income 
groups but has a greater net effect on the richest group. This suggests that for the average country in 
the Region, social expenditures, and hence the resulting social capital, are not well targeted to the 
poorest segments of society. It appears that the upper income classes are able to capture a sizable 
portion of the government-provided social capital. This is consistent with several studies that have 
shown that the upper middle and upper classes tend to benefit much from publicly-provided often free 
education, specially tertiary education, from subsidized health care, public pensions, and even certain 
social transfers (van de Walle, 1998; Cisse et al., 2007; Goni et.al., 2010).  
Turning now into the trade effects: The results in Table 2 suggest that direct impact of trade 
openness on household income of the poor is basically negligible but for the higher income groups the 
direct impact is positive (positive and significant for the upper middle income group and positive and 
nearly significant for the rich). Table 3 shows the net effects of trade openness once the trade-capital 
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stocks interactive effects are accounted for, all evaluated at mean values of the variables. The net 
impacts of trade openness are positive and significant for the top three income groups while are 
insignificant for the bottom group. Moreover, the elasticity of increasing trade openness on the income 
of the wealthiest households is almost twice as large as that for the two middle income groups.  Thus, 
the results suggest that while trade openness does not on average have a net deleterious effect on the 
poor it does tend to worsen income distribution by offering benefits mainly to the richest households.    
It is important to note the contrasting effects of government-provided social and non-social 
capital. Social capital enhances positive direct income impacts or reduces the size of negative direct 
income effects of trade openness. That is, despite that social capital is not well targeted to the poorest 
segments of society it does increase the benefits of increasing trade openness. By contrast, as reflected 
in the negative signs of the trade/capital stocks interactive coefficients, non-social government-
provided capital stocks worsen any possible negative effect of trade openness on the income of the 
three lowest income groups and has no significant effect on the effect of trade on the income of the 
richest households.  
The last column of Table 2 shows the estimates of the determinants of trade openness. The 
sign pattern of the trade policy variables is quite reasonable. The effects of both average tariff levels 
and their dispersion as measured by their coefficient of variability are highly significant and negative. 
The average tariff elasticity suggests that reducing tariff by 10% may increase trade openness by 
almost 2 % while reducing tariff dispersion by a similar magnitude may increase trade by about 0.7%. 
The effect of free trade agreement turned out to be positive although this effect is not as significant 
and robust as that of the tariff. This latter result would suggest that in Latin America the increasing 
number of free trade agreements has resulted in more trade creation than destruction. 
Comparing the net effects calculated using the coefficient estimated using the benchmark 
regression model in Table 3 with the estimates obtained using IV methods in Table AII.1 in Appendix 
2 shows a remarkable degree of similarity. While the actual values of the estimated coefficients are of 
course different the sign structure and significance of the coefficients are identical. In addition the 
relative values of the estimates are mostly preserved. For example both estimates yield the result that 
the stock of social capital has a similar positive and significant effects on all three lower income 
groups but a much higher also significant effect on the per capita income of the richest group. This 
high degree of consistency between the IV and non-IV estimates gives us confidence that the results 
using the benchmark model are free of simultaneous equation biases.     
2. Analysis of net effects using key aspects of the distribution 
of the variables 
The previous analysis focuses on net effects evaluated at the average values of the capital stocks and 
of the trade index. We now look at the net effects considering certain key aspects of the distribution of 
the relevant variables (the two social capitals and the index of trade openness) across countries and 
time.  Table 4 shows the critical values of these variables that lead to a reversal of the sign of the net 
effects. This table shows the sensitivity of the net effects to changes in these three variables.  The first 
row of the table shows that the net effect of social capital on the poorest group income reverses when 
the log of the value of the trade openness index is below -0.37.  The trade index is below -0.37 in 
about 12 % of the observations. That is, the net impact of the stock of social capital becomes 
detrimental for the poorest group in countries or periods in which the trade regime is highly restrictive. 
For the other three groups the critical values of the SATI index are lower than any value for the index 
observed in the sample. That is, for the other three groups the stock of social capital exerts a positive 
effect in the upper three income groups even under the most restricted trade regimes in the sample. 
The case of non-social government-provided capital is different: It has a detrimental effect for 
the poorest group regardless of the degree of openness observed but it causes the income of the second 
poorest group to increase when the economy is so closed that only occurs in 6% of the observations. It 
induces positive income effects in the lowest 45% of SATI for the middles class and is positive at all 
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levels of SATI for the wealthiest group.  Thus the first two rows of Table 4 show that social capital 
and trade tend to be complements while non-social capital can only have positive welfare effects 
among the poor only under very restrictive trade regimes.  
The net effects of trade openness, in turn, are also heavily dependent on the stocks of social 
and non-social capitals. A positive net impact of trade on the income of the poorest group requires a 
high level of social capital stock (a log value of 9.36) that is only satisfied by 49% of the observations. 
That is trade can be pro-poor only if the stock of social capital is so high that less than 50% of the 
observations satisfy. For the countries that have lower per capita social capital stocks the net effect of 
trade openness on the income of the poor is negative. Attaining a net effect of trade on the income of 
the higher income groups is much less demanding in terms of social capital: in most observations the 
net effect of trade is positive for the two middle class groups and is positive in practically all cases for 
the richest group. That is, unless the availability of social capital is extremely low, the rich always 
benefit out of trade liberalization but for lower income groups attaining positive effects of trade are 
increasingly more demanding in terms of social capital. 
 
TABLE 4 
CRITICAL VALUES FOR SIGN REVERSAL OF THE NET EFFECT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL, 
NON-SOCIAL CAPITAL AND SATI ON GROUP INCOME 
    Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Minimum value of log SATI for 
positive net effect of Social 
Capital on group income 
critical value for log SATI -0.37 -0.69 -1.01 -2.22 
% in the sample of SATI 
below critical value  12% 0 0 0 
Minimum value of log SATI for 
positive net effect of non Social 
Capital on group income 
critical value for log SATI -0.85 -0.51 -0.04 0.79 
% in the sample of SATI 
below critical value  0 6% 45% 100% 
Minimum value of log social 
capital  for positive net SATI 
effect (non-social capital 
evaluated at the mean) 
critical value for log of social 
capital  9.36 8.70 8.54 7.46 
% in the sample of social 
capital above critical value  49% 68% 71% 98% 
maximum value of log non 
social capital  for positive net 
SATI effect (social capital 
evaluated at the mean) 
critical value for log of non 
social capital  9.12 9.69 9.57 10.15 
% in the sample of non social 
capital below critical value  45% 76% 70% 98% 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
 
3. Economic growth and income distribution 
An important finding shown in Table 2 is the high responsiveness of most household income groups 
to changes in per capita GDP growth. Increasing the rate of economic growth tends to benefit the 
poorest income group more than proportionally and improves the income of the other groups less than 
proportionally. That is, accelerating economic growth appears to be pro-distribution. These results 
provide support and in fact strengthen findings in the literature concerning the effects of economic 
growth on household income. Dollar and Kraay (2002, 2004) and others have shown that economic 
growth causes the income of the poor to increase significantly. We show here that economic growth is 
not only pro-poor but that it is also a powerful factor of equity, by benefiting the poor more than the 
upper middle income groups and the rich. Economic growth appears to be a much more powerful and 
effective pro-distribution factor than social policies themselves.  
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It might seem surprising that the income of the rich is not significantly responsive to 
variations in the rate of economic growth. One possible explanation may be associated to the fact that 
the income sources of the rich are highly diversified both within the country and internationally. In 
addition the rich are likely to have much more flexibility to respond to macroeconomic fluctuations 
including their capacity to invest in the countries that grow the fastest and to move their investments 
into particular activities that grow in periods of general growth slowdown. What happens is that even 
in periods of slow average growth there are always sectors that are either not affected or that even 
prosper in such times. The rich have a much greater ability to identify activities not affected by the 
economic slowdown and move into such sectors. All this makes the income of the rich to be much less 
dependent on the fluctuations of the aggregate level of per capita income growth.   
C. Sensitivity analyses 
We perform a series of sensitivity analyses to ascertain the robustness of the estimators provided in 
Table 2. In addition to the specification tests reported earlier, we further alter or generalize the 
specification of the equations, we check for extreme data points that may dominate the sign and 
significance of the key estimates and for individual country dominance. 
1. Allowing for convergence (or divergence) 
Table 5 reports the results obtained when the specification of the equations is changed to incorporate 
the initial per capita income of each group as explanatory variables. That is, these estimates allow for 
convergence or divergence of the group incomes over the period.  We find that the initial income 
levels do add explanatory power to the regressions with the coefficients of these variables being 
highly significant. The fact that the coefficient of the initial per capita income is positive and 
significant for the bottom income group and negative and significant for the other three richer groups 
suggests a degree of per capita income convergence among the groups. However, allowing for 
convergence factors does not alter the basic sign structure of the coefficients associated with the 
government capital stocks and trade. All conclusions obtained using the benchmark regressions 
reported in Table 2 are in fact confirmed qualitatively. 
2. Further disaggregating the income groups 
We further disaggregate the households into ten groups instead of four. Table 6 shows these estimates. 
The qualitative findings are very similar to those using the more aggregated group structure. They do 
provide a few more details about the differential effects of social capital on group income. For 
example they show that that social spending appears to have the smallest impact on the income of the 
poorest 10% of the households. This is consistent with findings in the literature suggesting that 
government social programs have their greatest difficulties in reaching the extreme poor, which are 
the bottom 10% of the income distribution. 
3. Sample dominance 
Table AII.2 in Appendix 2 shows the results of the dominance test. We sequentially re-estimate the 
model withdrawing the top and bottom 2.5% of the observations for each of the capital stocks. As can 
be seen in this Table the qualitative effects and statistical significance of the net effects of the capital 
stocks on group per capita income is not affected by these procedures. That is, the key findings are not 
the result of freak observations that may dominate the estimation.  
We also perform dominance checks to verify whether the inclusion of specific countries 
dominate the results. We sequentially eliminate the observations from countries that contribute to less 
than 5 % of the total data points. Figures A1 to A4 show how the significance of the coefficients of the 
capital stock variables changes for each group when we implement these procedures. As can be seen 
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in these figures the only coefficient that falls outside the margin of significance when we omit the 
observations of at least one country is the direct effect of social capital on the poorest group. In fact 
when the observations for Nicaragua are excluded this coefficient becomes marginally insignificant 
although still positive. Excluding the observations of any other country does not affect the sign and 
significance of the coefficients. This apparent weakness of the direct effect of the social capital stock 
on the poorest group was already apparent in the estimation allowing for group convergence (see 
Table 4). However, the fact that the coefficient of the trade/social capital interaction remains positive 
and highly significant implies that the net effect of social capital is still robust. 
TABLE 5 
GROUP PER CAPITA INCOME ESTIMATES USING SUR-TIME VARYING COUNTRY EFFECTS 
METHOD CONTROLLING FOR GROUP-INCOME CONVERGENCE (LOG DIFFERENCES WITH TIME 
COUNTRY VARYING EFFECTS) 
Log Diff Per capita 
income of group 1 
Log Diff Per 
capita income 
of group 2 
Log Diff Per 
capita income 
of group 3 
Log Diff Per 
capita income 




Log Diff Per capita 
stock of social 
capital  
0.164  0.501 *** 0.594 *** 1.041 *** 0.400 *** 
0.121  0.0974  0.0915  0.145  0.0668  
Log Diff Per capita 
stock of non-social 
capital  
-0.823 *** -0.287 *** 0.0633  0.635 *** -0.0297  
0.116  0.0931  0.0874  0.138  0.0722  
Log Diff SATI   
1.48  0.19  1.95  0.186   
2.208  1.767  1.657  2.623   
Log Diff  (Per 
capita stock social 
capital*SATI)  
0.845 *** 0.578 *** 0.418 *** 0.368   
0.211  0.169  0.158  0.249   
Log Diff (Per capita 
stock non-social 
capital *SATI) 
-1.013 ** -0.574 * -0.612 ** -0.343   
0.41  0.328  0.307  0.485   
Log Diff Per capita 
GDP   
1.104 *** 0.705 *** 0.643 *** 0.0891  -0.582 *** 
0.263  0.211  0.197  0.312  0.148  
Number of active 
free trade 
agreements lagged 
    0.0387* ** 
    0.0146  
Tariff dispersion  
lagged 
    
-0.0499 *** 
    0.0111  
Log Diff tariff 
    
-0.170 *** 
    0.0321  
Log Initial per 
capita income  
0.00580 ** -0.00374 * -0.00613 *** -0.00870 ***  
0.00282  0.00199  0.00173  0.00243     
 
R-squared        0.888       0.892      0.905   0.885    0.901 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Note: * significant at 10%. 
** significant at 5%. 
*** significant at 1%. The total number of observations for the equation system is 720. Standard errors are shown 
below the coefficients. Estimation includes 124 coefficients that capture the time-varying country effects, which are 
not shown in the table. 
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TABLE 6 
GROUP INCOME ESTIMATES USING 10 INCOME GROUPS. SUR-TIME VARYING COUNTRY EFFECTS METHOD 
  Log Diff Per 
capita income 
of decile 1  
Log Diff Per 
capita income 
of decile 2 
Log Diff Per 
capita income 
of decile 3 
Log Diff Per 
capita income 
of decile 4 
Log Diff Per 
capita income 
of decile 5 
Log Diff Per 
capita income 
of decile 6 
Log Diff Per 
capita income 
of decile 7 
Log Diff Per 
capita income 
of decile 8 
Log Diff Per 
capita income 
of decile 9 
Log Diff Per 
capita income 




Log Diff Per 
capita stock of 
social capital  
-0.0322 0.284** 0.375*** 0.400*** 0.397*** 0.386*** 0.386*** 0.382*** 0.400*** 0.715*** 0.399*** 
0.188 0.128 0.102 0.0934 0.0885 0.0843 0.0829 0.0819 0.0829 0.128 0.0649 
Log Diff Per 
capita stock of 
non-social capital  
-1.499*** -0.952*** -0.663*** -0.521*** -0.427*** -0.357*** -0.270*** -0.137 0.0459 0.483*** -0.0409 
0.203 0.137 0.109 0.1 0.0952 0.0908 0.0894 0.0884 0.0896 0.139 0.0716 
Log Diff SATI   
1.878 0.305 -0.559 -0.228 0.354 1.33 1.788 2.642 4.762*** 3.375 
3.824 2.611 2.084 1.91 1.808 1.717 1.686 1.662 1.682 2.604 




1.208*** 1.055*** 0.813*** 0.714*** 0.641*** 0.586*** 0.475*** 0.383** 0.373** 0.307 
0.378 0.259 0.207 0.189 0.179 0.17 0.166 0.164 0.166 0.256 




-1.468** -1.129** -0.764* -0.682* -0.657* -0.701** -0.634** -0.635** -0.869*** -0.616 
0.729 0.499 0.398 0.365 0.345 0.327 0.321 0.316 0.32 0.495 
Log Diff Per 
capita GDP   
1.521*** 1.457*** 1.071*** 0.864*** 0.753*** 0.686*** 0.625*** 0.597*** 0.596*** 0.0177 -0.419*** 
0.468 0.318 0.254 0.233 0.221 0.21 0.207 0.204 0.207 0.32 0.147 











Log Diff tariff -0.230*** 
                    0.03 
 
R-squared  0.874 0.883 0.887 0.884 0.886 0.888 0.890 0.891 0.895 0.873 0.892 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Note: * significant at 10%. 
** significant at 5%.  
*** significant at 1%. The total number of observations for the equation system is 1584. Standard errors are shown below the coefficients. Estimation includes 124 coefficients that 






















































To the best of our knowledge this is the first analysis that considers the interdependences between the 
consequences of trade liberalization and fiscal expenditure policies for poverty and income 
distribution. We have shown that this approach is very fruitful providing several important policy 
relevant insights that were not systematically examined in previous studies. 
The main finding of this paper is that government-provided social capital goods are 
complementary with policies that promote trade openness. The benefits of trade openness especially for 
the low income and middle class household groups greatly depend on the size of the government-
provided social capital. Conversely, the benefits of social capital for the poor depend to a large extent on 
the degree of openness of the trade regime. Social capital has a much smaller effect on household 
incomes when trade is restricted and may even have a deleterious effect if trade is sufficiently restricted. 
Efforts to promote trade have lower positive effects for households if the per capita social capital is low. 
While government social capital stocks have positive effects for all household groups at least 
when trade is sufficiently open their effects are not pro-distribution. Social capital goods tend to benefit 
more the richest income groups than the middle income and poor households. A surprising finding is that 
government-provided non-social capital stocks only benefit the richest segments of society and is 
detrimental for the poor. Middle income households can only benefit out of non-social capital if the trade 
regime is highly restricted. Thus, trade and non-social capital are not complementary policies.   A reason 
for non-social capital to be mostly beneficial to rich households may be that the non-social component of 
the government-supplied capital stocks tend to be directed to the rich via subsidies and other types of 
expenditures that are greatly motivated by rent-seeking activities based on political contacts and campaign 
contribution which in Latin America are often the privilege of the richest segments of society. 
These results may have important implications for policy design. They suggests that the process 
of trade liberalization should be accompanied by a progressive reallocation of government spending 
from non-social to social goods, so that the stock of social capital is allowed to grow faster and non-
social capital at a slower pace. This would have direct net positive welfare effects on the middle income 
and poor households and at the same time it would greatly enhance the benefits of trade liberalization for 
the vast majority of the households. At the same time increasing trade liberalization would magnify the 
beneficial effects of shifting the structure of government-provided capital from non-social to social 
capital. Finally, the analysis suggests that trade reform should be implemented gradually to give time to 
allow the fiscal spending reallocation to manifest itself into changes in capital stocks. 
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Annexes 




SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE DATA USED IN REGRESSIONS 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Per capita income of group 1           882            362           343         2 089  
Per capita income of group 2        2 253            757        1 092         4 806  
Per capita income of group 3        4 380         1 339        2 063         8 578  
Per capita income of group 4      12 767         3 424        5 608       22 526  
Per capita Social Expenditure         1 023            653           150         2 573  
Per capita Non Social Expenditure            936            533           254         2 802  
Natural Log of SATI         -0.006              0.3            -0.6           0.7 
Per capita GDP        7 168         2 654        1 963       13 025  
Per capita stock of social capital       14 539       10 520        1 472       38 633  
Per capita stock of non-social capital       11 724         6 540        2 790       27 666  
polity2            7.9             1.5            1.0           10.0  
durable          18.9           18.2                 0          86.0  
polcomp            8.0             8.1              -88          10.0  
Source: Author’s elaboration. 




DEFINITION OF VARIABLES USED TO CALCULATE SATI 
Variable Name Definition Source 
trade Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured 
as a share of gross domestic product 
World Development 
Indicators 
population Population of the country, Millions of persons World Development Indicators 
area Geographical area of the country, Millions of square kilometers World Development Indicators 
GDP_percapita GDP per capita in constant 2000 US$ World Development Indicators 
oild70s Dummy with a value of one when the oil exports of a country represent at least 30% of their total exports for each year in the 70's 
UNCTAD Handbook 
of Statistics 2001 
oild80s Dummy with a value of one when the oil exports of a country represent at least 30% of their total exports for each year in the 80's 
UNCTAD Handbook 
of Statistics 2001 
oild90s Dummy with a value of one when the oil exports of a country represent at least 30% of their total exports for each year in the 90's 
UNCTAD Handbook 
of Statistics 2001 
IndEconomy Industrial Market Economy: dummy variable which assigns the value of 
one to countries that are considered industrialized. OECD 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
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Annex 2 
IV estimates and dominance checks 
TABLE A3 
3SLS ESTIMATES OF PER CAPITA INCOME WITH INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES   
(LOG DIFFERENCES WITH TIME COUNTRY VARYING EFFECTS) 
 
Log Diff Per capita 
income of group 1  
Log Diff Per capita 
income of group 2 
Log Diff Per capita 
income of group 3 
Log Diff Per capita 
income of group 4 
 
Log Diff Per capita 
stock of social 
capital  
0.409*** 0.409*** 0.394*** 0.601*** 
0.138 0.115 0.101 0.156 
Log Diff Per capita 
stock of non-social 
capital  
-0.864*** -0.404*** 0.0323 0.760*** 
0.145 0.12 0.105 0.163 
Log Diff SATI   
0.243 0.773*** 0.734*** 1.076*** 
0.197 0.164 0.143 0.222 
Log Diff Per capita 
GDP   
1.158*** 0.770*** 0.556** -0.0612 
0.317 0.263 0.23 0.357 
R-squared  0.835 0.831 0.871 0.850 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Note: * significant at 10%. 
** significant at 5%. 
*** significant at 1%. The total number of observations for the equation system is 576. Standard errors are shown below 
the coefficients. Estimations include country*year dummies. Log diff social capital, log diff non-social capital and log diff 
SATI are instrumented using lag of social capital, lag of non-social capital, political competition, years of duration of the 
last political regime, polity 2, number of active free trade agreements lagged, tariff dispersion lagged and log diff tariff. 
First stage R2 are about 0.78 for social capital, 0.90 for non social capital and 0.88 for SATI. 
 
TABLE A4 
DOMINANCE TESTS OF THE EFFECT OF THE STOCK OF SOCIAL CAPITAL  
ON PER CAPITA INCOME OF EACH GROUP 
Coefficient of the Per 
capita stock of social 
capital  in the 
regression of Group 1 
Coefficient of the Per 
capita stock of social 
capital in the 
regression of Group 2 
Coefficient of the Per 
capita stock of social 
capital in the 
regression of Group 3 
Coefficient of the Per 
capita stock of social 
capital in the 
regression of Group 4 
Dropping top 
2.5% of per 
capita income 
0.32*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.71*** 
0.11 0.09 0.08 0.13 
Dropping bottom  
2.5% of per 
capita income 
0.31*** 0.23** 0.28*** 0.71*** 
0.11 0.10 0.10 0.13 
Dropping top 
2.5% of stock 
social 
0.32*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 0.71*** 
0.11 0.09 0.08 0.13 
Dropping bottom 
2.5% of stock 
social 
0.24* 0.30*** 0.35*** 0.67*** 
0.14 0.11 0.10 0.16 
Source: Author’s elaboration.  
Note: * significant at 10%. 
** significant at 5%. 
*** significant at 1%. 
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Country dominance checks* 
FIGURE A5a 
SUR ESTIMATES, NET EFFECT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN GROUP 1 
ONE COUNTRY EXCLUDED FROM EACH ESTIMATION, 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Note: Excluded countries represent less than 5% of the total number of observations. 
 
FIGURE A5b 
SUR ESTIMATES, NET EFFECT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN GROUP 2 
ONE COUNTRY EXCLUDED FROM EACH ESTIMATION, 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Note: Excluded countries represent less than 5% of the total number of observations. 
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FIGURE A5c 
SUR ESTIMATES, NET EFFECT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN GROUP 3 
ONE COUNTRY EXCLUDED FROM EACH ESTIMATION, 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 




SUR ESTIMATES, NET EFFECT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN GROUP 4 
ONE COUNTRY EXCLUDED FROM EACH ESTIMATION, 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Note: Excluded countries represent less than 5% of the total number of observations. 
